Les commentaires et analyses développés n'engagent que leurs auteurs qui restent seuls responsables des erreurs et insuffisances.
I. Introduction
The choice of an exchange rate regime (ERR) has been so far the foremost battleground between the advocates of the exchange rate stability and those supporting the capacity of the exchange rate policy to handle real shocks. Up until the beginning of the 70s, a traditional view widely vehicled by the Bretton Woods monetary arrangements defended pegged regimes as the most workable exchange arrangement for promoting macroeconomic performance, including a low volatility of the exchange rate. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the emergence of several intermediate arrangements revived the issue relative to the choice of the appropriate ERR, all the more that the resurgence of crisis episodes revealed the vulnerability of hard pegs. 1 As pointed out by Fisher (2001) , the virulence of East Asia and Latin American crises shifted the balance toward the choice of more flexible exchange rate systems. In addition, the worldwide feature of the recent crisis, irrespective of countries' ERR, tends to mitigate the vision relative to the safety of corner solutions compared to intermediated ERR, regarding the surge of crises. Consequently, one might reasonably ask if the choice of the ERR really matters for the incidence of crises, and moreover which ERR is more or less vulnerable to crises.
Although these questions were tackled already, the existing contributions failed to reach a consensus on the vulnerability of alternative ERR to crises. On the one hand, a major strand of the literature (see below; see also Fisher, 2001 , for a survey) argues that extreme (fixed or floating) regimes are disciplinary, while intermediate regimes are crisis-prone, i.e. the well-known bipolar view, establishing a formal link between the ERR and the probability of crisis. On the other hand, several influential papers, including Burnside et al., (2001, 2004) , support that fixed regimes are, by construction, vulnerable to speculative attacks and particularly sensitive to banking and currency crises.
Building upon this growing and controversial literature, our paper aims at exploring the choice of the appropriate ERR when it comes to gauging crises. First, we shed a fresh light on the stark controversy that plagues the literature relative to the crisis proneness of alternative ERR; to this end, we begin by contrasting the proponents and the critics of the bipolar view. Second, using a panel of developed and developing countries over the period 1980-2009, we conduct a systematic analysis of the vulnerability of the three core ERR to 1 The crisis episodes in Mexico (1994) , Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea (1997) , Russia and Brazil (1998) , Ecuador (1999), and Turkey (2000) , led to the perception that adjustable fixed exchange rate regimes are inherently fragile and crisis-prone (see, for example, Fischer 2001; Ghosh et al., 2002 , Husain et al., 2005 . In addition, following the collapse of Argentina's Currency Board, the stability of hard pegs has been equally questioned (see, for example, Fisher, 2001) . different types of crises, namely banking, currency and debt crises, by properly accounting for different control variables for each type of crisis.
Our results are the following. First, our baseline estimations show that intermediate ERR are not more vulnerable to banking or currency crises than pegged or floating regimes.
Consequently, these findings clearly break down the bipolar view that intermediate regimes are systematically more vulnerable to banking or currency crises. Second, we explore, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, the proneness of alternative ERR to sovereign debt crises. Our findings do not emphasize a significant difference between corner and floating ERR in terms of their vulnerability to debt crises, contradicting, once again, the bipolar view.
Third, we show that our results are robust to a wide set of tests, namely (i) when taking into account the contagion effects between crises, (ii) when splitting the sample according to the level of economic development or the time period; (iii) when performing estimations with alternative methods; (iv) when controlling for different variables or (v) when using alternative definitions for the ERR or (vi) alternative databases for the main variables, namely ERR and crises.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on the link between ERR and crises surge, Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and the data, Section 4 emphasizes and discusses our main results, Section 5 performs a wide robustness analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
II. Literature review
The modern literature on crises experienced a particular development starting the 80's, following several episodes of currency crises in Latin American and Asian economies. The abundant theoretical literature focusing on the determinants of currency crises (see the wellknown contributions of Krugman, 1979 , Obstfeld, 1986 , and Chang and Velasco, 2000 first, second, and respectively third-generation models of currency crises) fuelled a more recent empirical literature illustrating a wider perspective of crises.
If we stick to the relation between the exchange rate regime (ERR) and the likelihood of crises, several authors, including Arteta and Eichengreen (2000) , Aghion et al. (2001) or Stiglitz (2002) conclude to the absence of any effect of ERR on crises. 2 Moreover, Esaka (2010a, b) and Asici (2011) do not establish a clear ranking of ERR, but instead assert that the 2 According to these authors, crises have other determinants but the ERR, including, if we refer to banking crises, the rapid domestic credit growth, large bank liabilities relative to reserves and deposit rate decontrol. In addition, Haile and Pozo (2006) discuss the difference between de facto and de jure ERR for the surge of crises. appropriateness of the chosen regime depends on structural characteristics of each country.
Alternatively, an important strand of literature (see the upper part of Table 1) argues that corner solutions, which consist of pegging or floating, are less vulnerable to crises compared to intermediate ERR. However, this bipolar view was criticized by several papers, presented in the bottom part of Table 1 . Overall, it seems that the existing literature has not yet provided clear-cut results regarding the eventual vulnerability to crises of alternative exchange rate regimes.
III. Empirical strategy and data
We first present the econometric specification and then discuss the data used in our study.
Econometric specification and estimation strategies
To estimate the extent to which alternatives exchange rate regimes might be vulnerable to the occurrence of different types of crises, we adopt the following binary choice model
where Crisis is a dummy variable coded 1 if country i experiences a crisis at time t and 0 otherwise. X is a vector of control variables (see below) and it ε is the error term. We rely upon logit models to estimate equation (1). To mitigate possible endogeneity problems, we explain the likelihood of crisis in the current period using lagged variables, including the ERR.
Data
Our study is conducted within a panel of 90 countries over the period 1980-2009, according to data availability. The time span is subdivided into ten periods of three years each and variables are three-year-averaged. 3 To capture a crisis event, we built a dummy variable coded one if a given country experiences at least one crisis episode during the three years subperiod, and zero otherwise. The following subsections discuss extensively our main variables, namely the crisis and the ERR, and then present the set of control variables.
Definition of crises
To capture crisis episodes, we use the crisis database developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) , combined with that of Leaven and Valencia (2012) . According to these datasets, crisis episodes are defined as follows. First, banking crisis occur in two cases, namely when bankruns lead to closure, merging or takeover by public sector of one or more financial institutions, and when, although there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover or largescale government assistance of an important financial institution marks the start of a string of 3 The length of three years for our subperiods is consistent with the existent literature (see, for example, Frankel and Rose, 1996; Arteta and Eichengreen, 2000 , Esaka 2010a ,b, or Asici, 2011 . The empirical literature often drops out the observations following a crisis episode to avoid the reverse causality problem. Since this method is not exempted from criticisms in the sense that dropping out observations can raise an attrition bias and alter conclusions, we refrain from using it in the paper. Financial crises or bank collapses refer to banking crises; analogously, currency crashes correspond to currency crises; finally, debt crises and sovereign debt default are used interchangeably. 5 The list of countries, the definition of variables and the sources of data, and some descriptive statistics are detailed in the Appendices 1 and 2.
Definition of exchange rate regimes (ERR)
We measure ERR using the exchange rate regimes de facto classification of the IMF (see Appendix 3). 6 Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of ERR using the income level-based 6 Since the use of de jure classification was found to engender misleading statistical inference in the assessment of the link between crises and ERR (Edwards and Sevestano, 1999, and Rogoff et al., 2004) , we refrain from using it. In addition, we draw upon the natural de facto classification of Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) in our robustness analysis. 7 Since according to the European Commission (Directorate-General for Trade) the trade volume is stronger within the EMU compared to other non-EMU partners, it is plausible to consider EMU countries as being under a pegged rather than a floating regime. Based on the IMF classification, 160 (namely 17.8%) out of the 894 available observations are associated to banking crises, and out of the total of these crises episodes almost half (namely 73) concern countries with pegged ERR. Pegged arrangements are also the most affected by currency and debt crises (more than 50%), which occurred in 1 out of 4 and 9 periods respectively, according to the IMF classification. Although the use of the IRR classification reduces the number of available observations, the distribution among the different types of crises is comparable for debt crises, with 4 percentage points more (less) for banking (currency) crises. However, one significant difference is that most of crises occur in intermediate ERR when using the IRR classification.
Control variables
Our analysis distinguishes among three types of crises, namely banking, debt and currency crises; consequently, when selecting control variables, we focused on the most appropriate variables for each type of crisis.
Regarding banking crisis, the first control variable is the domestic credit to the private sector. 8 Following Demirgüç- Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Arteta and Eichengreen (2000) , credit expansion is a salient feature in the occurrence of crises, as highlighted by the recent financial crisis. A rapid development of banking credit reflects either a credit market with sufficiently safe borrowers or a situation of risk misassessment. This latter case can be very damaging for the stability of the financial system, since it favors the growing up of financial bubbles arising from rapid credit growth with lenders seeking permanently for more profits. Such a situation is unsustainable, and the collapse of the bubble weakens the financial system and can trigger panic/bank runs. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of the domestic credit on the probability of banking crises. The second control variable is the volatility of the domestic credit, measured by the standard deviation of domestic credits. High credit volatility can have damaging effects by leading to credit misallocation and by blurring private agents'
foresights. Consequently, we expect credit volatility to increase the odds of banking crisis.
The third control variable is the sum between the claims on the domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank and the private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions, as a GDP ratio. It allows capturing differences in the size of the financial sector.
On the one hand, a sizeable financial sector with complex financial products and multiple market players can be thought as detrimental because of greater exposure to financial imbalances. On the other hand, a large size of the financial sector can increase the risk-sharing opportunity. Therefore, the expected impact of the size of the financial sector on the probability of banking crises is ambiguous. Fourth, a variable of intermediation, built as the ratio between private credit supply and private deposits, proxies the ability of transforming deposits into credits, i.e. the intermediation capacity of the banking sector. The expected sign is positive. Finally, in addition to these four fundamental determinants of banking crises, we consider a variable that may affect banking crises' probability, namely the regulation of the credit market. Intuitively, we expect a negative influence since authorities' regulation of the credit market tends to lower the risk taken by bankers and therefore reduces the likelihood of crises.
Let us now turn our attention to currency crises fundamentals. First, the variable reserves money growth measures seigniorage revenues. Based on Buiter (2007), we define seigniorage as resources appropriated by monetary authorities through their capacity to issue zero interest fiat money, and measure it as the variation in the monetary base in percentage of GDP. This variable is particularly relevant in first-generation crises models, concluding that the main cause of currency crashes is the financing of fiscal deficits using seigniorage.
Second, to reveal the fiscal stance of the government, and more widely the design of the fiscal policy, we consider the primary fiscal balance (FB), defined as the difference between fiscal revenues and expenditures. Large fiscal deficits may be an indirect source of financial imbalances, by generating inconsistency between fiscal and exchange rate policies (see firstgeneration crises models) and therefore leading to currency and/or banking crises, as equally defended by the FTC hypothesis. Finally, in addition to these fundamentals, we consider subsequent variables that could affect the probability of currency crisis, namely the domestic credit to the private sector, broad money and the current account (Esaka, 2010a, b) .
To evaluate the likelihood of debt crises, we consider first public debt, as a GDP ratio.
Given that public debt is a prominent variable to predict sovereign debt defaults, its expected effect is positive. In addition, according to a recent literature emphasizing non-linear effects (see, for example, Ardagna et al., 2006) , we equally account for the square of the debt to GDP ratio. Second, inflation may be a salient feature in predicting the occurrence of debt crises.
While inflation may reduce the odds of domestic debt default, it also may increase the burden of the foreign currency-denominated debt when it leads to a nominal depreciation. Therefore the expected sign is ambiguous. Third, political institutions could also predict the likelihood of debt crises. We account for it by controlling whether there exist any constraints on the executive; if so, the odds of debt crises are expected to decrease, as the room for the incumbent government to overspend is somewhat reduced. Finally, some external conditions, as the aid flows, could influence the occurrence of debt crisis. Since these flows can be used to face the debt burden (in terms of interests and capital repayment) and therefore mitigate the probability of debt default, we expect a negative sign on the likelihood of debt default.
The set of controls also includes variables that are common to all type of crises. On the one hand, output growth is assumed to negatively influence the occurrence of banking, currency or debt crisis. The output growth may help avoid banking disturbances by providing additional resources for the private sector and strengthening its capacity to meet credit reimbursement commitments. Regarding currency crises, the output growth leads to an increase in foreign exchange reserves and allows authorities supporting the fixity of the exchange rate or at least postponing the collapse of the peg. The same rationale prevails for debt crises, as in times of growth the increase of the resources of the government enhances its capacity to meet its commitments. On the other hand, as suggested by Glick and Hutchison, (2005) and Glick et al. (2006) , the capital account openness captures the influence of the restrictions (or liberalization) of the capital account on the probability of banking, currency and debt crises. Starting from regression (1), we explore the sensitivity of the effect of ERR on the probability of banking crises by progressively adding relevant control variables. Notice that a 1 percentage point increase in domestic credit (DC) or in its volatility increases the incidence of banking crises by roughly 1 and 5-6 percentage points respectively, a result consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) . Instead, as shown by columns (5)-(8), better credit market (CM) regulation, higher growth and a lower intermediation ratio reduce the probability of banking crises. Irrespective of the control variables used, the coefficient of the variable Peg or float is statistically not significant in regressions (1)-(8). These results clearly fail to support the bipolar view, since intermediate regimes are not more prone to banking crises than corner, namely pegged or floating, regimes. 9
IV. Estimation results: the likelihood of crises
Let us now discuss the results for currency crises, depicted in Table 3 .2. As shown by columns (5)-(8), the seigniorage increases the odds of currency crises, confirming the fiscal theory of currency crises. We also notice that the capital account openness decreases the probability of currency crises (column 8), as it offers more flexibility in the implementation of 9 Our findings are unchanged when performing regressions (1)-(8) by holding the number of observations constant (results are provided in the Supplementary Material section at the end of the manuscript).
the monetary policy for countries under fixed regimes (Esaka, 2010a, b) . Finally, the fiscal balance (FB) does not matter in the prediction of currency crises: what matters is not whether governments generate fiscal deficits, but rather the way they finance such deficits. The non-significance of the variable Peg or float, whatever the control variables considered, breaks down the bipolar view, as there is no evidence that intermediate regimes are more prone to currency crises than pegs or floats.
Finally, the Table 3 .3 focuses on debt crises. Unlike the two previous crises (banking and currency), empirical evidence on the determinants of debt crises is remarkably scarce. Among the most important fundamentals, macroeconomic imbalances in terms of unsustainable public debt affect the occurrence of debt crises. The positive sign of the squared term suggests that a large share of public debt to GDP increases the odds of debt default, with some non-linearity. On the contrary, output growth reduces significantly the incidence of default 10 Finally, results in column (7) support the use of aid flows as a hedge against sovereign debt default, since higher aid significantly decreases the odds of debt crises.
Coming back to our main analysis, we follow the strategy emphasized earlier and contrast intermediate regimes with corner regimes. As emphasized by columns (1)- (8), there is no support that intermediate regimes matter for debt crisis compared to fixed or peg exchange rate regimes. 11 In short, we clearly break down the bipolar view, as the occurrence of banking, currency or debt crises was not found to be related to the presence of a particular exchange rate regime.
V. Sensitivity Analysis
The goal of this section is to explore the robustness of our results. For each type of crises, we consider the widest specification, namely column (8) from Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 above. In addition, to better focus our analysis and keep the paper short, we present all along this sensitivity section only interest coefficients (full results are at the end of the manuscript as supplementary material).
Accounting for contagion effects
A strand of influential papers, including Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) or Reinhart and
Rogoff (2011), emphasized the importance of contagion effects between different types of crises in a given country. We present in Table 4 results for the influence of the ERR on the likelihood of crises, when controlling for such contagion effects. 1 Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. All specifications include time dummies. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). The full table is reported as supplementary material at the end of the manuscript.
The burst of other types of crises increases the probability of having a banking, currency or debt crisis (except for the effect that transits from banking to currency crises, which is found not significant). However, even when accounting for the presence of such important contagion effects, we find yet again no support for an influence of ERR on the probability of experiencing a banking, currency or debt crisis.
Is the proneness of the regimes influenced by the level of development or the time period?
An important criticism of our analysis may be related to the possible heterogeneities in the effect of the ERR on the likelihood of crises, depending on the level of economic development. For example, one should account for the absence of debt crises for high income countries during the period we consider. One alternative to tackle this shortcoming is to include the GDP per capita, capturing the level of economic development, as an additional explanatory variable. 12 However, a better solution is to perform individual regressions for each group of countries, according to their level of development (Table 5 .1). For generality, we draw upon the World Bank's country income level classification and distinguish among high income, including OECD, countries (HIC), upper middle income countries (UMIC) and low and lower middle income countries (LIC and LMIC respectively). In addition to this analysis, our results might be biased by time heterogeneity.
Therefore, we check the stability of our findings by performing estimations on two subperiods, namely before and after 1990. This splitting was chosen to reflect the worldwide major institutional changes related to the end of the Cold War. Whatever the crisis considered, the variable of interest is never significant (Table 5 .2). Therefore, our results show that the rejection of the bipolar view is not specific to a period. 
Are the results robust to the estimation method?
In the following, we allow for alternative methods of estimation of the effect of the ERR on the likelihood of crises. According to Table 6 .1, the use of fixed, instead of random, effects logit or of probit estimators has no qualitative effects on the coefficients of our interest variable Peg or float, which remain statistically not significant. In addition, the significance of these coefficients is not improved when considering OLS, instead of binary, estimators in Table 6 .2.
Consequently, our previous findings of non-systematic vulnerability of intermediate ERR to banking, currency and sovereign debt crises are robust to alternative estimation methods, contradicting yet again the bipolar view.
Alternative definitions of the ERR variable
In our main regressions, we differentiated among corner ERR, namely peg or float ERR, and intermediate regimes. In the following, we refine this classification by specifically differentiating among peg and float ERR, while still keeping the intermediated regimes as reference (see Appendix 3). (2). These findings are supported by the results illustrated in column (3), where we simultaneously account for the effect of peg and floating ERR on the likelihood of banking crises. Moreover, the high p-values of the equality tests between the coefficients of peg and float variables confirm that the effect of alternative corner ERR, namely peg or floating, on the likelihood of banking crises is statistically identical, supporting our strategy of considering them jointly in our main analysis. While the results are more mitigated for currency crises (columns 4-6), the evidence for debt crises (columns 7-9) confirms once again the absence of significant differences between the effects of corner and intermediate ERR on the likelihood of crises.
In the following, we go one step further, by additionally decomposing our corner ERR variable. As emphasized by Table 8 based on IMF's classification, the variable Peg or float is the one used in our main analysis. Starting from this benchmark, we restrict the definition of corner ERR regimes by progressively dropping conventional peg and managed float ERR (Peg or Float1), currency union and EMU regimes (Peg or Float2) and currency boards (Peg or Float3). Notice that following this logic, the variable Peg or Float3 corresponds to the most narrow definition of corner ERR regimes, since it includes only extreme forms of pegs (another currency as legal tender, for example dollarization) and extreme forms of floating (floating regimes, namely freely floating). The rationale is that the more extreme the ERR, the bigger the room for finding a significant effect on the likelihood of crises for these extreme ERR compared to intermediate ERR. According to the first column of The first four columns of Table 10 .1 report estimations based on the IMF's classification of ERR. For robustness issues, we disentangle the interest variable in several alternative variables measuring corner ERR, following the definitions used previously. As emphasized by columns (1)-(4) of Table 10 .1, the coefficient of our interest variable is statistically not significant, supporting our previous findings that corner exchange rate regimes are not more prone to banking crises compared to intermediate regimes.
In the following, we investigate the robustness of our results to the use of an alternative classification for our main variable, namely ERR. To do so, we draw upon the Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff's (2010) natural de facto classification of ERR, and define the following dummies. Peg_or_float is the widest measure of corner ERR, since it includes all forms of peg (namely hard pegs and de facto pegs) and all forms of floating (namely managed and freely floating), as reported by Table 11 and Appendix 4. By so doing, the variable Peg_or_float aims at matching, to the extent to which this is possible given the use of two different databases, the variable Peg or float based on the IMF database. Using the variable Peg_or_float as benchmark, we refine it as follows. Peg_or_float_1
includes the same corner regimes, but we exclude freely falling observations from intermediate regimes. According to IRR, freely falling observations refer to countries that present inflation rates above 40%, irrespective of their ERR. Next, we restrict the definition of corner ERR by progressively dropping de facto pegs (Peg_or_float_2) and managed float regimes (Peg_or_float_3). As previously, the rationale is that restricting at most the definition of corner ERR might unveil a significant effect compared to intermediate ERR.
The results based on the use of the IRR database for the ERR are illustrated in columns (5)-(8) in 
VI. Conclusion
This paper offers an overview on the link between crises and exchange rate regimes. Based on a panel of developing and developed countries over the period 1980-2009, we show that the type of exchange rate regime is unimportant when it comes to explaining the likelihood of crises. This result holds to a wide set of robustness specifications. First, our findings do not characterize a specific type of crisis, but they are common to banking, currency and debt crises, and also when controlling for appropriate determinants of each type of crisis. Second, accounting for contagion effects between the three types of crises or controlling for the level of economic development leaves our results unchanged. Third, our results are robust to the use of alternative definitions of corner ERR. Finally, conducting the analysis on alternative databases for our main variables, namely ERR and crises, has no impact on our findings.
Consequently, our results vigorously contradict the view that intermediate exchange rate regimes are more prone to crises than hard pegs and independently floating regimes. In other words, although the likelihood of crises might depend of fiscal, financial and monetary variables, it is not related to the exchange rate regime in place. Thus, we clearly break down the bipolar view.
The policy implications of this paper appear straightforward. Our main findings show that crises and ERR are not systematically interrelated. Therefore, countries aiming at preventing economic crises should not focus on the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime alone, and instead proceed to structural reforms by implementing sound macroeconomic and financial policies to safeguard against crises-conducting behaviors, such as reckless credit expansion, unsustainable fiscal policy or exploding debt paths policies.
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Appendix 4: Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) classification of ERR Codes Fine classifications
Coarse classification 1 No separate legal tender Pegged 2 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 3 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 4 De facto peg 5 Pre announced crawling peg Intermediate 6 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 7 De factor crawling peg 8 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% 11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e. it allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time) 1 Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. All specifications include time dummies. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). Significance: * 10%; ** 5% and *** 1%. P-values are given in brackets. All specifications include time dummies. Hausman specification test suggested random effects with the Logit estimator. Coefficients displayed are marginal effects. No debt crises for HIC during the period of our analysis. The predictive power is calculated using a cutoff point of 25% as in Esaka (2010b). 
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